

PSEUDORANDOMNESS

AN OVERVIEW

by

Oded GOLDREICH

WEIZMANN INST.

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PS/prg-106.ps](http://www.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/PS/prg-106.ps)

RANDOMNESS & COMPUTATION

• RANDOMNESS as a TOOL

Used in COMPUTATION

Essential uses include

+ CRYPTOGRAPHY

& DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING

+ PROB. PROOF SYSTEMS (IP, ZK, PCP)

+ Sampling & PROPERTY TESTING

(Omitted: use in standard ALGORITHMS)

• RANDOMNESS as an OBJECT

viewed by COMPUTATION

⇒ Computational Indistinguishability

⇒ Different objects viewed as equiv. by resource-bounded computations.

⇒ Potential saving/elimination of RANDOMNESS in COMPUT.
(because conesp. applc. cannot tell...)

COMPUTATIONAL VIEW OF RANDOMNESS

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COMPUTATIONAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY

$$X \equiv Y$$

$$Z = \{Z_n\}$$

$$X \stackrel{s}{=} Y \stackrel{\circ}{=} \sum_{\alpha} |\text{Prob}[X_n = \alpha] - \text{Prob}[Y_n = \alpha]|$$

is $\text{negl}(n)$

RELAX ↓

$$X \stackrel{c}{=} Y \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \text{Efficient algorithms}$$

(and/or ALG of certain class)

"cannot tell these apart"


Classes to consider

- Poly-time alg.
- Poly-size circuits (non-uniform)
- Quad-size circuits
- Space-bounded alg.
- Syn. restricted alg.
(projection, linear, hitting)

COMPUTATIONAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY

$Z = \{Z_k\}$, where $Z_k \in \{0,1\}^k$ or $\{0,1\}^{\ell(k)}$

DEF: X and Y are ϵ -indistinguishable by D



(potential distinguisher)

D's verdict is INSIGNIFICANT

$$\left| \text{Prob}[D(X_k)=1] - \text{Prob}[D(Y_k)=1] \right| \leq \epsilon(k)$$

Typically, ϵ is NEGLIGIBLE
 $= 1/\text{complexity}(D)$

When class of ALG is understood,
 we say that X & Y are COMPUT.
INDISTING.

Notions of PSEUDORANDOM GENERATORS

$G: \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{l(k)}$ is a PRG (generic) if

(1) STRETCH $l(k) > k$ ($l(k) \gg k$)

- l is a polynomial

- l is an exponential [$l(k) = 2^{\Theta(k)}$]

(2) EFFICIENT GENERATION

- each bit produced in POLY-TIME

- each bit produced in EXP-TIME

(3) PSEUDORANDOMNESS \equiv Computational Indist. from the uniform (i.e. $\{U_{l(k)}\}$)

- by (PROB.) POLY-TIME ALG.

- by QUAD-SIZE CIRCUITS.

GENERAL
PURPOSE
PRG

canonical
DERANDOMIZER

GEN more complex than D

Two popular notions of PRG

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• GENERAL-PURPOSE PRG

Can be used to save RANDOMNESS in ANY (efficient) application.*

Output looks RANDOM also to OBSERVER that uses MORE RESOURCES THAN ^{the} PRG.

• CANONICAL DERANDOMIZER

May (& typically does) use more RESOURCES THAN the OBSERVER.

Suffices for denandomization of ALGs of specific complexity.

*) Essential to CRYPTO/ADVERSARY APPLICATIONS.

AMPLIFYING THE STRETCH


4''

of GENERAL-PURPOSE PRGs

Suppose $G: \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{k+1}$ is a PRG,
and $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is a polynomial (st. $f(k) > k$)


NAIVE ITERATION METHOD

$G^l(s) \triangleq G^{f(|s|)-|s|}(s)$, where $G^{i+1}(x) \triangleq G(G^i(x))$
and $G^0(x) \triangleq x$



FIXED-LENGTH ITERATION METHOD

$G^l(s) \triangleq \tau_1 \cdot \tau_2 \cdots \tau_{f(|s|)}$, where $s_0 \triangleq s$
and $\tau_i s_i \triangleq G(s_{i-1})$



CONSTRUCTING GENERAL-PURPOSE PRG

HARDNESS
VS
RANDOMNESS

DEF: $f: \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^k$ is a OWF if

(1) poly-time computable

(2) HARD to INVERT on AVERAGE-CASE

\forall ppt A , $\text{PROB}_{x \in \{0,1\}^k} [A(f(x)) \in f^{-1}(f(x))] = \text{negl}(k)$

THM: PRG exist iff OWF exist.

PRG \Rightarrow OWF: $G: \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2k}$ PRG

$\Rightarrow f(x,y) \equiv G(x)$ for $|x|=|y|$

Inverting f on $f(U_{2k}) \equiv G(U_k)$
implies DIST. $G(U_k)$ FROM U_{2k}

(since the latter has f -preimage w. NEGL. PROB.).

OWF \Rightarrow PRG:

We'll only show a special case.

OWF implies PRG

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DEF: $b: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is a HARDCORE of f if

- (1) $x \rightarrow b(x)$ is POLY-TIME COMPUTABLE
- (2) $f(x) \rightarrow b(x)$ is HARD TO PREDICT ON AVERAGE-CASE
 \forall ppt A , $\text{Prob}_x [A(f(x)) = b(x)] < \frac{1}{2} + \text{NEGL}(n)$

Note: $b(x)$ HARD TO PREDICT from $f(x)$

$$\sim \underbrace{\{f(u_k) \cdot b(u_k)\}}_{\text{same}} \equiv \{f(u_k) \cdot u_i\} \quad \leftarrow \text{Independent}$$

• Indivi. bits may not be HARDCORE;

e.g., $f(x, y) = (f'(x), y)$

• If f is 1-1 & easy to invert

then it has no HARDCORE. $\boxed{f(x) \rightarrow x \rightarrow b(x)}$

For a 1-1 OWF f , any HARDCORE b yields a PRG $G(s) = f(s) \cdot b(s)$.

Amplifying STRETCH

$\underbrace{\quad}_{\text{uniform}} \quad \leftarrow \text{unpredict.}$

OWF \Rightarrow Hardcore

OWF $f_0 \Rightarrow$ OWF $f(x, r) = (f_0(x, r), b(x, r))$
 $b(x, r) = \sum_{i=1}^k x_i r_i \pmod 2$
+ HC

LEMMA:

Suppose, given $B: \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ s.t. $\exists x \in \{0,1\}^k$

$$\text{Prob}_{r \in \{0,1\}^k} [B(r) = b(x, r)] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$$

Then, in $\text{poly}(k/\epsilon)$ -time, can guess x correctly
w.p. $\geq \text{poly}(\epsilon/k)$

$$B_x(r) \equiv A(f(x), r)$$

Warm-up: Suppose $p_x \equiv \text{Prob}[B(r) = b(x, r)] \geq \frac{3}{4} + \epsilon$

\Rightarrow Recover x_j w.p. $1 - 2 \cdot (1 - p_x) \geq \frac{1}{2} + 2\epsilon$

by $r \in \{0,1\}^k$ & output $B(r) \oplus B(r \oplus e^j)$

$$[b(x, r) \oplus b(x, r \oplus e^j) = (\sum_{i=1}^k x_i r_i) + (x_j + \sum_{i=1}^k x_i r_i) = x_j]$$

Eliminate error-doubling

+ Majority rule
 $\alpha^{(n/\epsilon^2)}$ PAIRWISE INDEP.
VOTES
 $m \approx \frac{1}{\epsilon^2}$

Suppose $r^{(1)}, \dots, r^{(m)} \in \{0,1\}^k$ PAIRWISE INDEP.

and we KNOW $b(x, r^{(1)}), \dots, b(x, r^{(m)})$.

Then $\text{MAJ}_{i \in [m]} \left\{ b(x, r^{(i)}) \oplus B(r^{(i)} \oplus e^j) \right\} = x_j$

with prob. $\geq 1 - \frac{1}{2^k}$

[single call to B , per 'vote']

How?

Generating PAIRWISE IND. samples in $\{0,1\}^k$ with known $b(x, \cdot)$ - values 71

Select $s^{(1)}, \dots, s^{(l)} \in_R \{0,1\}^k$, where $l = \log_2(m+1)$

Guess $b(x, s^{(1)}), \dots, b(x, s^{(l)}) \in \{0,1\}$

[correct w.p. $2^{-l} = \frac{1}{m+1} = \frac{1}{\#\{x \in \mathcal{X}\}}$]

Generate $\langle R^{(I)} \rangle_{I \subseteq [l]}$ st. $R^{(I)} = \bigoplus_{i \in I} s^{(i)}$
and note

that

$$b(x, R^{(I)}) = b(x, \bigoplus_{i \in I} s^{(i)})$$
$$= \bigoplus_{i \in I} b(x, s^{(i)})$$

Thus, w.p. $\frac{1}{m+1}$, we obtain the correct values for all $b(x, R^{(I)})$'s.

+ Note: $R^{(I)}$'s are PAIRWISE IND and uniformly dist. in $\{0,1\}^k$.

HARDNESS vs. RANDOMNESS, ACT 2

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$G: \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{f(k)}$ is a CANONICAL DERANDOMIZER
if G is EXP-TIME Comput. & $\{G(U_k)\} \stackrel{\text{a.s.}}{=} \{U_{f(k)}\}$.

DERANDOMIZATION of A , where $A(x, r)$ with
 $|r| = t_A(|x|) = \text{poly}(|x|)$

- $A'(x, s) = A(x, G(s))$

where $|s| = l^{-1}(t_A(|x|)) \doteq k$

$\forall x \quad |\text{Prob}[A(x, G(U_k))=1] - \text{Prob}[A(x, U_{f(k)})=1]| < \frac{1}{10}$

- $A''(x) = \text{maj}_{s \in \{0,1\}^k} \{A'(x, s)\}$

running time = $2^k \cdot (t_A(|x|) + t_G(k))$

THM: If \exists can. denand. with $l(k) = 2^{\Omega(k)}$

then $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$. $k = l^{-1}(\text{poly}(n)) = O(\log n)$
 $\Rightarrow 2^k = \text{poly}(n)$

THM: If $E = \text{Dtime}(2^{o(n)})$ contains a problem
of circuit complexity $2^{\Omega(n)}$ [in worst-case sense
but a.e.]
then \exists can. denand. with $l(k) = 2^{\Omega(k)}$

$\exists c > 0$ s.t. $\text{Dtime}(2^n) \not\subseteq \text{Size}(2^{c \cdot n})$

Hierarchy
&
"advice"

Constructing a CANON. DERANDOMIZER

Omitted: Worst-case hardness \Rightarrow Average-Case HARDNESS

$$\exists f \in E \text{ s.t. } \forall 2^{\Omega(m)}\text{-size circuit } C_m$$
$$\text{Prob}_{x \in \{0,1\}^m} [C_m(x) = f(x)] < \frac{1}{2} + 2^{-\Omega(m)}$$

constr.

$$G(\underset{k}{s}) = f(s|_{I_1}) \cdot f(s|_{I_2}) \cdots f(s|_{I_{\ell(k)}}) \text{ where}$$

- compute $I_1, I_2, \dots, I_{\ell(k)}$

- evaluate f on few points

$$I_j \subseteq [k]$$

$$|I_j| = m$$

$$\forall j \neq i \quad |I_j \cap I_i| \leq m' \ll m$$

$$\text{time} \sim 2^{O(m)} \gg \ell(k) = 2^{\Theta(k)} \sim (\text{circuit-size})^k$$
$$= \exp(\alpha(k))$$

Pseudorandomness \leftrightarrow Unpredictability

\rightarrow Obvious (since UNIFORM is unpredict.)

see next
2 use this!

WARM-UP: Suppose (I_j) 's are Disjoint.

INTUITION TO REAL CASE:

Small intersections "bound" the gain

from $f(s|_{I_1}) \cdots f(s|_{I_j})$


towards predicting $f(s|_{I_{j+1}})$

"limited" depend.
on $s|_{I_{j+1}}$

Unpredictability \Rightarrow Pseudorandomness


Suppose $\{Z_k\}$ is not pseudorandom; i.e.
There exists A s.t. $\{Z_k\} \neq \{U_{\ell(k)}\}$.

Consider **HYBRIDS**



i^{th} hybrid

Note $H_k^{(0)} \equiv U_{\ell(k)}$ & $H_k^{(\ell(k))} \equiv Z_k$ (extreme HYBRIDS differ)



\downarrow
 $\ell(k)$ gap at Neighbor. HYBRIDS

can emulate this...

can distinguish i^{th} bit from a random value

(when given i -prefix of Z_k)

\Downarrow
can predict i^{th} bit

PRGs FOR SPACE-BOUNDED DISTINGUISHERS

THM: Every Prob. Poly-Time algorithm
can be emulated by a PPT algorithm
of RANDOMNESS = $O(\text{input} + \text{original space complex.})$

Conj: Similar with
RANDOMNESS = $O(\text{log input} + \text{original space complex})$

Support

- (1) a PRG with $|\text{seed}| = (\text{space complex})^2$
- (2) $BPL \subseteq SC \stackrel{\Delta}{=} TCSp(\text{poly}, \text{polylog})$
- (3) $UConn \in L$ [2005]
 \uparrow
 RL
 [1979]

(2') $BPL \subseteq DSPACE((\text{log})^{1.5})$

SPECIAL-PURPOSE PRGs

PROJECTION TESTS \Rightarrow t-wise indep. PRG

$$G(s_0, \dots, s_{t-1}) = \left(\sum_{j=0}^{t-1} s_j \cdot \alpha_i^j \right)_{i=1, \dots, \ell(k)}$$

$s_0, \dots, s_{t-1}, \alpha_i$ etc are field elements

• APPLICATIONS

LINEAR TESTS \Rightarrow small-bias PRG

$$G(s, f) = \text{LFSR}_f(s)$$

FEEDBACK
RULE $\rightarrow f$

START
SEQ. $\leftarrow s$

Application: "PCP of linear system" (ditto quad. sys.)

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{---} = x \\ \text{---} = xx \\ \text{---} = xxx \\ \vdots \\ \text{---} = x \end{array}$$


\Rightarrow

(few) linear
combinations
of the rows

HITTING TESTS \Rightarrow EXPANDER WALK PRG

$$G(s, \underbrace{v_1, \dots, v_{\ell-1}}_{\text{seq. of vertices}}) = (v_0, v_1, \dots, v_{\ell-1})$$

$\forall S \subseteq \text{VERTEX SET}$
of density $\geq 1/2$



Prob[sequence does not
hit the set S] $< 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$

Some Credits

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Comput. Indist. \sim [GOLDWASSER+MICALI] + [YAO]

GEN. PUR. PRG \sim [BLUM+MICALI] + [YAO]

CONSTRUCTION of gen.pur. PRG

- hardcore + iterations [BM]

- hardcore for any ONF [GOLDREICH+LEVIN]

- The Char. THM. [HASTAD, IMPAGLIAZO, LEVIN+LUBY]

Canonical Derandomizers [NISAN+WIGDERSON]

$E \notin \text{size}(2^{1(n)}) \Rightarrow \text{BPP} = \text{P}$ [Impag. + Wigderson]

PRG for SPACE-BOUNDED DISTING.

[NISAN+ZUCKERMAN], [NISAN]², [REINGOLD]

SPECIAL-PURPOSE PRGs

• k-MISE [CHOR+GOLDREICH] + [ALON, BABAI+ITAI]

• Small-bias [NAOR²] + [ALON, GOLDREICH, HASTAD] + PERALTA

• EXPANDER WALK [AJTAI, KOMLOS + SZEMEREDI]

More details/material @

<http://www.weizmann.ac.il/~oded>

/pp_pseudo.html