The GGM Construction does NOT yield Correlation Intractable Function Ensembles

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Abstract. We consider the function ensembles emerging from the construction of Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali (GGM), when applied to an *arbitrary* pseudoramdon generator. We show that, in general, such functions fail to yield correlation intractable ensembles. Specifically, it may happen that, given a description of such a function, one can easily find an input that is mapped to zero under this function.

Keywords: Cryptography, Correlation Intractability.

An early version of this work appeared as TR96-042 of ECCC.

1 Introduction

The general context of this work is the so-called Random Oracle Methodolody, or rather its critical review, undertaken by Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi [CGH98], Loosely speaking, this methodology suggests to design cryptographic schemes in a two-step process. In the first step, an ideal scheme is designed in an ideal model in which all parties (including the adversary) have access to a random orcale. In the second step, the ideal scheme is realized by replacing the random oracle by a fully-specified function (selected at random in some function emsemble (see Definition 1)), while providing all parties with a description of the function.

Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi [CGH98] showed that, in general, this methodology may lead to the design of insecure schemes. That is, in general, it may be that the ideal scheme is secure in the ideal model (in which all parties have access to a random orcale), but replacing the random oracle by any function ensemble yields an insecure scheme. Their analysis is based on the notion of correlation intractability, which seems a very minimal requirement from such a replacement. Loosely speaking, a function f is correlation intractable with respect to a sparse binary relation R if it is infeasible (given a description of f) to find x such that $(x, f(x)) \in R$. The point is that the sparseness condition implies that when given access to a random oracle \mathcal{O} it is infeasible to find x such that $(x, \mathcal{O}(x)) \in R$, and so we should require the same from the function f. Before proceeding, let use clarify two of the aforementioned notions.

1.1 Function ensembles and correlation intractability

A function ensemble is a collection of finite functions, where each function has a finite description (viewed as its index in the ensemble). The functions map strings

of certain length to strings of another length, where these lengths are determined as a function of the index length. For simplicity, we consider a (natural) special case in which the input and output lengths are equal.

Definition 1 (function ensembles): Let $\ell : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$. A function ensemble with length ℓ is a set of functions $F = \{f_s\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^*}$ such that each function f_s maps $\ell(|s)$ -bit long strings to $\ell(|s)$ -bit long strings. That is:

$$F \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ f_s : \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)} \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)} \}_{s \in \{0,1\}^*}.$$
(1)

An imprortant requirement, which we avoid here, is that the function ensemble be *efficiently computable* (i.e., that there exists an efficient algorithm A such that for every $s \in \{0,1\}^*$ and every $x \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)}$ it holds that $A(s,x) = f_s(x)$).

Turning to the notion of correlation intractabily, we again consider a (natural) special case (of a more general definition from [CGH98]). Loosely speaking, a function ensemble F is correlation intractable with respect to a binary relation Rif every feasible adversary, given a uniformly distributed $s \in \{0,1\}^k$, fails to find an $x \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)}$ such that $(x, f_s(x)) \in R$, except with negligible probability.

Definition 2 (correlation intractabily): Let F be as in Definition 1.

- Let $R \subseteq \bigcup_k \{0,1\}^{\ell(k)} \times \{0,1\}^{\ell(k)}$. We say that F is correlation intractable with respect to R if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A it holds that

$$\Pr_{s \in \{0,1\}^k} [(A(s), f_s(A(s)) \in R] = \mu(k),$$

where the probability is taken uiformly over $s \in \{0,1\}^k$ and the internal coin tosses of A, and μ is some negligible function (i.e., for every positive polynomial p, and all sufficiently large k, it holds that $\mu(k) < 1/p(k)$).

- Let R be as in Part 1. We say that R is sparse if

$$\max_{\mathbf{y} \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(k)}} \left\{ \left| \{ y \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(k)} : (x,y) \in R \} \right| \right\} = \mu(k) \cdot 2^{\ell(k)},$$

where μ is some negligible function.

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- We say that F is correlation intractable if it is correlation intractable with respect to every sparse relation.

Note that Part 2 implies that a random oracle is correlation intractable with respect to R (in the sense that for every probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine M it holds that $\Pr[(M^{\mathcal{O}}(1^k), \mathcal{O}(M^{\mathcal{O}}(1^k)) \in R] = \mu(k))$, where $\mathcal{O} : \{0, 1\}^{\ell(k)} \to \{0, 1\}^{\ell(k)}$ denotes a random function).

Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi [CGH98] showed that that no function ensembles (with length $\ell(k) \geq k$) are correlation intractable. In particular, they showed that the function ensemble $F = \{f_s\}$ is not correlation intractable with respect to the "diagonalization" relation $D = \{(x, f_{x'}(x)) : x \in \{0, 1\}^*\}$, where x' is a prefix (of adequate length) of x (i.e., $|x| = \ell(|x'|) \geq |x'|$).

1.2 Our results

In view of the foregoing, we focus on function ensembles with length $\ell : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ such that $\ell(k) \leq k$ (and recall that for $\ell(k) < k/2$ no negative results are known). Furthermore, we will focus on the special case of "constant" relations; that is, relations of the form $R = \{(x, y) : x \in \{0, 1\}^* \land y \in S \cap \{0, 1\}^{|x|}\}$, for some (sparse) set $S \subset \{0, 1\}^*$. We investigate natural candidates for function ensembles that may be correlation intractable in such a restricted sense. Note that in this case, correlation intractability means the infeasibility of finding an input x such that $f_s(x) \in S$, where s is given to us as input.

The failure of generic pseudorandom functions. One natural candidate for restricted notions of correlation intractability is provided by pseudorandom function ensembles (as defined in [GGM84]). However, these ensembles may fail (w.r.t correlation intractability), because they guarantee nothing with respect to adversaries that are given the function's description (i.e., s). Indeed, in general, pseudorandom function ensembles may not be correlation intractable w.r.t some very simple relations (e.g., $R_0 = \{(x, 0^{|x|}) : x \in \{0, 1\}^*\}$): The reason is that any pseudorandom function ensemble $\{f_s\}$ can be modified into a pseudorandom function ensemble $\{f'_{r,s}\}$ such that $f'_{r,s}(x) = 0^{|x|}$ if x = r and $f'_{r,s}(x) = f_s(x)$ otherwise. Thus, given the description (r, s) of a function, we can easily find an input x (i.e., x = r) such that $(x, f'_{r,s}(x)) \in R_0$.

The failure of the GGM construction. Our main interest here is in a specific (natural) construction of pseudorandom functions (based on pseudorandom generators). That is, while one may argue that the aforementioned failure of generic pseudorandom functions is due to a contrived example, we show that a natural construction of pseudorandom functions fails (i.e., it is not correlation intractable w.r.t some simple relations such as the aforementioned R_0). Specifically, we refer to the construction of pseudorandom functions due to Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [GGM84]. Recall that in their construction, hereafter referred to as the GGM construction, a function $f_s : \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)} \to \{0,1\}^{|s|}$ is define based on a (length doubling) pseudorandom generator G such that

$$f_s(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} G_{x_\ell}(G_{x_{\ell-1}}(\cdots G_{x_1}(s)\cdots)), \tag{2}$$

where $G(z) = G_0(z)G_1(z)$, $\ell \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \ell(|s|)$, and $x = x_1 \cdots x_\ell \in \{0,1\}^\ell$. A length preserving version of f_s is obtained by considering only the $\ell(|s|)$ -bit long prefix of $f_s(x)$. (Recall that we assume here that $\ell(k) \leq k$.) Our main result is:

Theorem 3 (main result): If there exists pseudorandom generators, then there exists a pseudorandom generator G such that the function ensemble resulting from applying Eq. (2) to G is not correlation intractable with respect to the relation $R_0 = \{(x, 0^{|x|}) : x \in \{0, 1\}^*\}.$

That is, although the resulting function ensemble is pseudorandom (cf. [GGM84]), given the description s of a function in the ensemble, one can find in polynomialtime an input x such that $f_s(x) = 0^{|x|}$. The result can be easily extended to hitting other relations. The rest of the paper is devoted to establishing Theorem 3.

2 The overall plan and an abstraction

The first observation is that 0^{ℓ} is likely to have a preimage under f_s , and the central idea is that, for a carefully constructed G, this preimage is easy to find when given s. Intuitively, G is constructed such that (1) either $G_0(s)$ or $G_1(s)$ is likely to have a longer all-zero prefix than s, and (2) it is always the case that either $G_0(s)$ or $G_1(s)$ has an all-zero prefix that is at least as long as the one in s.

Notation. (At this point, the reader may think of n as equal k.)¹ For t = 0, ..., n - 1, let $S_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{0^t 1 \gamma : \gamma \in \{0, 1\}^{n-(t+1)}\}$ be the set of *n*-bit long strings having a (maximal) all-zero prefix of length t. Let P_t be the set of strings $\alpha\beta \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ such that $\alpha, \beta \in \bigcup_{i=0}^t S_i$ and either $\alpha \in S_t$ or $\beta \in S_t$. That is:

$$P_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \alpha \beta : \alpha, \beta \in (\cup_{i=0}^t S_i) \land (\alpha \in S_t \lor \beta \in S_t) \right\}$$
(3)

$$= \left\{ \alpha\beta : (\alpha, \beta \in S_t) \lor \left(\alpha \in S_t \land \beta \in \bigcup_{i=0}^{t-1} S_i \right) \lor \left(\alpha \in \bigcup_{i=0}^{t-1} S_i \land \beta \in S_t \right) \right\}.$$
(4)

Our aim is to construct a pseudorandom generator G such that for every $t \leq \ell$ and $\alpha \in S_t$ it holds that $G(\alpha) \in \bigcup_{i \geq t} P_i$, and for a constant fraction of $\alpha \in$ S_t it holds that $G(\alpha) \in \bigcup_{i \geq t+1} P_i$. Intuitively, given $s_\lambda \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s$ we may find an $x = x_1 \cdots x_\ell$ such that $f_s(x)$ has an all-zero prefix of length $\Omega(\ell)$, by iteratively inspecting both parts of $G(s_{x_1 \cdots x_i})$ for the current $s_{x_1 \cdots x_i}$ and setting x_{i+1} such that $s_{x_1 \cdots x_i x_{i+1}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} G_{x_{i+1}}(s_{x_1 \cdots x_i})$ is the part with a longer all-zero prefix.

The desired random mapping. In order to implement and analyze the foregoing idea, we first introduce a random process $\Pi : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{2n}$ with the intention of satisfying the following three properties:

- 1. $\Pi(U_n) \equiv U_{2n}$, where U_m denotes the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}^m$.
- 2. For every $t \leq \ell$ and $\alpha \in S_t$, it holds that $\Pi(\alpha) \in \bigcup_{i \geq t} P_i$.
- 3. For every $t \leq \ell$ and $\alpha \in S_t$, it holds that $\Pr[\Pi(\alpha) \in \bigcup_{i \geq t+1} P_i] > c$, where c > 0 is a universal constant.

One natural way to define Π is to proceed in iterations, starting with t = 0. In each iteration, we map seeds in S_t to outcomes in P_t until P_t gets enough probability mass, and map the residual probability mass to $\bigcup_{i \ge t+1} P_i$ (first to P_{t+1} , next to P_{t+2} , etc). In order to satisfy the foregoing Conditions 1 and 2, it must hold that, for every t, the fraction of n-bit seeds residing in $\bigcup_{i=0}^{t} S_i$ is at least as big as the fraction of 2n-bit long outcomes in $\bigcup_{i=0}^{t} P_i$. In fact, to satisfy Condition 3 the former must be sufficiently bigger than the latter. (Actually, we shall see that Condition 3 follows from the other two conditions.)

We now turn to the analysis of the desired process Π . Let $s_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[U_n \in S_t] = 2^{-(t+1)}$, and $p_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[U_{2n} \in P_t]$. By Eq. (3)-(4), it holds that $p_t = s_t^2 + 2s_t \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} s_i$. The following technical claim will play a key role in our analysis.

¹ At a later point, it will become clear why we chose to use n rather than k here.

Claim 4 (central technical claim): For every $t \ge 0$:

1.
$$\sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i\right)^2$$
.
2. $\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i = \frac{1}{1-2^{-(t+1)}} \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i > (1+2^{-(t+1)}) \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i$.
3. $\Delta_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i - \sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i > \frac{1}{2} \cdot p_{t+1}$. Furthermore, $\Delta_t > (1-2^{-t}) \cdot p_{t+1}$.

Part 3 is not used in the actual analysis, and so its proof is moved to the Appendix.

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Proof: We first establish Part 1:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i = \sum_{i=0}^{t} \left(s_i^2 + 2s_i \sum_{j=0}^{i-1} s_j \right)$$
$$= \sum_{i,j \in \{0,\dots,t\}} s_i s_j$$
$$= \left(\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i \right)_{.}^2$$

Combining Part 1 and $\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i = \sum_{i=0}^{t} 2^{-(i+1)} = 1 - 2^{-(t+1)}$, we get $\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i = (1 - 2^{-(t+1)})^{-1} \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i$. Part 2 follows (using $(1 - \epsilon)^{-1} > 1 + \epsilon$ for $\epsilon > 0$).

Using Claim 4, it follows that by the time we get to deal with seeds in S_t $(t \ge 1)$, we have already spend a probability mass of $\sum_{i=0}^{t-1} s_i - \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} p_i > \frac{1}{2}p_t$ towards covering P_t . Thus, some seeds in S_{t-1} are mapped to P_t (or to $\bigcup_{i\ge t}P_i$). The following claim implies that seeds in S_{t-1} are actually mapped to either P_{t-1} or P_t (but never to $\bigcup_{i\ge t}P_i$).

Claim 5 (another technical claim): $\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i = \sum_{i=0}^{t+1} p_i - 2^{-(2t+4)} < \sum_{i=0}^{t+1} p_i$

Proof: Using Part 1 of Claim 4 (and $s_j = 2^{-(j+1)}$), we get:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{t+1} p_i = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{t+1} s_i\right)^2$$
$$= \left(1 - 2^{-(t+2)}\right)^2$$
$$= 1 - 2^{-(t+1)} + 2^{-(2t+4)}$$
$$= 2^{-(2t+4)} + \sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i$$

and the current claim follows.

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The implementation of Π . Given Claims 4 and 5, we explicitly define the process Π . On input $\alpha \in S_0$, with probability $p_0/s_0 = 1/2$, we output a uniformly selected element of P_0 , otherwise we output a uniformly selected element of P_1 . For $t \geq 1$, on input $\alpha \in S_t$, we first compute $\Delta_{t-1} = \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} s_i - \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} p_i$. (Note that by Claims 4 and 5 it holds that $0 < \Delta_{t-1} < p_t$, and $p_t - \Delta_{t-1} = s_t - \Delta_t < s_t$ follows.) With probability $(p_t - \Delta_{t-1})/s_t$, we output a uniformly selected element of P_t , otherwise we output a uniformly selected element of P_{t-1} . Indeed, $0 < (p_t - \Delta_{t-1})/s_t < 1$. Thus, Π is well-defined.

Note that Π can be implemented in probabilistic polynomial-time. Combining Claims 4 and 5, we get:

Proposition 6 (Π satisfies the desired properties):

- 1. $\Pi(U_n) \equiv U_{2n}$, where U_m denotes the uniform distribution on $\{0,1\}^m$.
- 2. For every $t \leq \ell$ and $\alpha \in S_t$, it holds that $\Pi(\alpha) \in P_t \cup P_{t+1}$.
- 3. For every $t \leq \ell$ and $\alpha \in S_t$, it holds that $\Pr[\Pi(\alpha) \in P_{t+1}] \geq 1/2$.

Part 3 (which follows from Part 3 of Claim 4) is not used in the actual analysis and is only given for intuition.

Proof: Part 2 is immediate by the construction. It is also clear that $\Pi(U_n)$ is uniform over each of the P_t 's. Thus, to prove Part 1 it suffices to show that, for every t, it holds that $\Pr[\Pi(U_n) \in P_t] = p_t$. In proving this, we use Part 2 (i.e., $\Pi(\alpha) \in P_t \cup P_{t+1}$ for every $\alpha \in S_t$). We first consider the case of t = 0, and get

$$\Pr[\Pi(U_n) \in P_0] = \Pr[U_n \in S_0] \cdot \Pr[\Pi(U_n) \in P_0 | U_n \in S_0]$$
$$= s_0 \cdot \frac{p_0}{s_0} = p_0.$$

For $t \geq 1$ (using $\Delta_{-1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 0$ in case t = 1), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\Pi(U_n) \in P_t] &= \Pr[U_n \in S_t] \cdot \Pr[\Pi(U_n) \in P_t | U_n \in S_t] \\ &+ \Pr[U_n \in S_{t-1}] \cdot \Pr[\Pi(U_n) \in P_t | U_n \in S_{t-1}] \\ &= s_t \cdot \frac{p_t - \Delta_{t-1}}{s_t} + s_{t-1} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{p_{t-1} - \Delta_{t-2}}{s_{t-1}}\right) \\ &= p_t - \Delta_{t-1} + s_{t-1} - p_{t-1} + \Delta_{t-2} \\ &= p_t, \end{aligned}$$

since $\Delta_{t-1} = \Delta_{t-2} + s_{t-1} - p_{t-1}$.

Part 3 follows by noting that for every $\alpha \in S_t$ (with $t \ge 1$),

$$\Pr[\Pi(\alpha) \in P_{t+1}] = 1 - \frac{p_t - \Delta_{t-1}}{s_t}$$
$$= \frac{\sum_{i=0}^t s_t - \sum_{i=0}^t p_i}{s_t}$$
$$> \frac{(1 - 2^{-t}) \cdot s_t}{s_t} \ge \frac{1}{2}$$

where the strict inequality is due to $\Delta_t > (1 - 2^{-t}) \cdot 2^{-(t+1)} = (1 - 2^{-t}) \cdot s_t$ (which is established in the first paragraph of the Appendix). For $\alpha \in S_0$, it holds that $\Pr[\Pi(\alpha) \in P_1] = 1 - (p_0/s_0) = 1/2$.

The randomly-labeled tree: We consider a depth ℓ binary tree with nodes labeled by *n*-bit long strings. The root is labeled with a uniformly selected string, and if a node is labeled with α then its children are labeled with the corresponding parts of $\Pi(\alpha)$. (The root is said to be in level 0 and the 2^{ℓ} leaves are in level ℓ .)

Using induction on $i = 0, 1..., \ell$ (and relying on Part 1 of Proposition 6), it follows that the nodes at level i are assigned independently and uniformly distributed labels. Specifically, suppose that the claim holds for level i, then using Part 1 of Proposition 6 the claim holds for level i + 1. On the other hand, by Part 2 of Proposition 6, the labels along each path from the root to a leaf belong to S_j 's such that the sequence of j's increases by at most one unit at each step.

Now, on the one hand, with probability $s_0 + s_1 = 3/4$, the (level 0) root has a label in $S_0 \cup S_1$. On the other hand, with probability $1 - (1 - s_\ell)^{2^\ell} = 1 - (1 - 2^{-(\ell+1)})^{2^\ell} > 0.39$, there exists a (level ℓ) leaf with label in S_ℓ . We conclude that, with probability at least 0.39 - 0.25 = 0.14, the root has label in $S_0 \cup S_1$ and there exist a leaf with a label in S_ℓ . Furthermore, due to the mild-increasing property of the label sequence along each path, the i^{th} intermediate node on the path from the root to this leaf must have a label in $S_i \cup S_{i+1}$.² On the other hand, the expected number of level *i* nodes with label in $S_i \cup S_{i+1}$ is $2^i \cdot (2^{-(i+1)} + 2^{-(i+2)}) =$ 3/4. Thus, except with exponentially vanishing probability, level *i* contains less than *n* nodes with label in $S_i \cup S_{i+1}$. To summarize, with probability at least 0.13, the following good event holds:

- 1. The root has label in $S_0 \cup S_1$.
- 2. There exist a leaf with a label in S_{ℓ} . Furthermore, the i^{th} intermediate node on the path from the root to this leaf has a label in $S_i \cup S_{i+1}$.
- 3. For every $i \leq \ell$, level *i* has at most *n* nodes that have a label in $S_i \cup S_{i+1}$.

The following search procedure is "geared towards" the foregoing good event.

The (ideal) search procedure: Starting at the root, proceed in a DFS-like manner according to the following rule: If the currently reached node is at level i and has a level not in $S_i \cup S_{i+1}$, then backtrack immediately, else develop it according to the standard DFS-rule. If we ever reach a leaf having a label in S_{ℓ} , then the search is considered successful.

Assuming that the good event holds, the search is successful. Furthermore, in this case the search has visited at most 2n nodes at each level (i.e., the

² Recall that a node with label in S_j has children with labels in $\bigcup_{k=0}^{j+1} S_k$. Since the root has label in $S_0 \cup S_1$, each node at level *i* has a label in $\bigcup_{k=0}^{i+1} S_k$. Furthermore, since the specific leaf on the said path has a label in S_ℓ , the *i*th intermediate node on the said path cannot have a label in $\bigcup_{k=0}^{i-1} S_k$.

children of parents that were DFS-developed), and so the complexity is bounded by $O(\ell \cdot n)$. In fact, the complexity analysis depends only on the third condition (in the definition of a good event), and thus holds except for with exponentially vanishing probability.

3 The actual construction

Recall that we have given a probabilistic polynomial-time implementation of Π . We now consider a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm Π' satisfying $\Pi'(\alpha, U_m) \equiv \Pi(\alpha)$, where $m = \text{poly}(|\alpha|)$. Next, using suitable pseudorandom generators G' and G'' (i.e., $G' : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ and $G'' : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{4n}$), we replace $\Pi' : \{0,1\}^{n+m} \to \{0,1\}^{2n}$ by $\Pi'' : \{0,1\}^{n+2n} \to \{0,1\}^{2\cdot(n+2n)}$ such that

$$\Pi''(\alpha, r'r'') = ((\alpha_1, r_1), (\alpha_2, r_2))$$
⁽⁵⁾

where
$$(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = \Pi'(\alpha, G'(r'))$$
 and $(r_1, r_2) = G''(r'')$ (6)

That is, $|r_1| = |r_2| = |r'r''|$ and $|r'| = |r''| = |\alpha|$.

Theorem 7 (Theorem 3, specialized): Let $\ell : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ such that $\ell(k) \leq k$ and let $G \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pi''$. Then:

- 1. G is a pseudorandom generator.
- 2. Let $f'_s : \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)} \to \{0,1\}^{|s|}$ be defined by applying Eq. (2) to G, and let $f_s : \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)} \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)}$ be defined by letting $f_s(x)$ equal the $\ell(|s|)$ -bit long prefix of $f'_s(x)$. Then, the function ensemble $\{f_s\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^*}$ is not correlation intractable with respect to the relation $R_0 = \{(x,0^{|x|}) : x \in \{0,1\}^*\}$. That is, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that given a uniformly distributed $s \in \{0,1\}^n$, finds with probability at least 1/10 a string $x \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)}$ such that $f_s(x) = 0^{\ell(|s|)}$.

Theorem 3 follows.

Proof: In order to prove Part 1 we first observe that $\Pi'(U_n, U_m) \equiv U_{2n}$. Letting U_n, U'_n, U''_n denote independent random variables each uniformly distributed in $\{0, 1\}^n$, we recall that $\Pi''(U_n, U'_n U''_n) = ((Z_1, R_1), (Z_n, R_n))$, where $(Z_1, Z_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pi'(U_n, G'(U'_n))$ and $(R_1, R_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} G''(U''_n)$. Thus, $\Pi''(U_n, U'_n U''_n)$ is computationally indistinguishable from $((Z'_1, R'_1), (Z'_n, R'_n))$, where $(Z'_1, Z'_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pi'(U_n, U_m)$ and (R'_1, R'_2) is uniformly distributed over $\{0, 1\}^{2n} \times \{0, 1\}^{2n}$. It follows that $G(U_{3n}) \equiv \Pi''(U_n, U''_n)$ is computationally indistinguishable from $((U'_n, U''_n))$. Since G is computable in polynomial-time, and $|G(U_{3n})| = 6n$, Part 1 follows.

In order to prove Part 2, we consider an algorithm that on input $s \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ invokes the ideal search procedure described at the end of Section 2, while providing it with labels of an imaginary depth $\ell = \ell(n)$ binary tree as follows. The label of the root is the *n*-bit long prefix of *s*, and the 2*n*-bit long suffix is

called the secret of the root. If an internal node has label $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and secret $s's'' \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$, then its children will have labels corresponding to the two *n*bit long parts of $\Pi'(\alpha, G'(s'))$ and secrets corresponding to the two 2*n*-bit long parts of G''(s''). We stress that the search procedure is only given the labels of nodes (at its request), but it is not given the nodes' secrets. Note that the way in which we label the nodes corresponds to the way the function ensemble $\{f_s\}$ is defined (using $G = \Pi''$).

Recall that the search procedure succeeds with probability at least 0.13 on the randomly-label tree, called the ideal setting, where the children of a node labeled by α are assigned labels that corresponding to the two *n*-bit long parts of $\Pi'(\alpha, U_m)$. Our aim is to show that approximately the same must occur in the foregoing real setting, where the tree is labeled according to Π'' (or, equivalently, according to $\Pi'(\cdot, G'(\cdot))$ and $G''(\cdot)$). To prove this claim, consider a hybrid setting in which all nodes are associated uniformly distributed secrets (rather than secrets derived by applying G'' to the second part of their parent's secret), and the children of a node labeled by α are assigned labels that corresponding to the two *n*-bit long parts of $\Pi'(\alpha, G'(s'))$, where s' is the first part of the parent's secret (and the second part is never used). We observe that:

1. The success probability of the search in the ideal setting is approximately the same as its success in the hybrid setting.

Otherwise, we derive a contradiction to the hypothesis that G' is a pseudorandom generator. Specifically, we will show how to distinguish $n \cdot \ell$ samples of the distribution $G'(U_n)$ from $n \cdot \ell$ samples of the distribution U_m . Given a sequence of samples, we run the search procedure while feeding it with labels generated on-the-fly as follows.

- The root is assigned a uniformly distributed label, and labels that were assigned to nodes are used whenever the node is visited.
- When reaching a node (e.g., the root) for the first time, we assign labels to its children by using the next unused sample. Specifically, if the new node has label $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and the next sample in the input sequence is $s' \in \{0, 1\}^m$ then we assign its children (as labels) the corresponding parts of $\Pi'(\alpha, s') \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$.

Note that when the input sequence is taken from U_m , the foregoing process describes the ideal setting, whereas when the input sequence is taken from $G'(U_n)$ we get the hybrid setting.

2. The success probability of the search in the real setting is approximately the same as its success in the hybrid setting.

Otherwise, we derive a contradiction to the hypothesis that G'' is a pseudorandom generator by considering ℓ additional hybrid settings. For $i = 1, ..., \ell$, the *i*th hybrid (or *i*-hybrid) consists of running the foregoing search while feeding it with labels generated on-the-fly as follows. The label of a node al level j < i is generated as in the hybrid setting; that is, these nodes are assigned uniformly distributed secrets (and the children of such a node labeled by α are assigned labels that corresponding to the two *n*-bit long parts of $\Pi'(\alpha, G'(s'))$, where s' is the first part of the parent's secret). On the other hand, the label of a node al level $j \ge i$ is generated as in the real setting; that is, these nodes are assigned secrets that are derived from the second part of their parent's secret (and are assigned labels exactly as in case j < i). That is, if a node at level j - 1 has secret s's'', then its children are always labeled according to $\Pi'(\alpha, G'(s'))$, whereas the secrets that they are assigned are either uniformly distributed or derived from G''(s'')depending on whether j < i or $j \ge i$. Note that the ℓ -hybrid corresponds to the hybrid setting, whereas the 1-hybrid corresponds to the real setting. Thus, it suffices to show that for every $i \in \{1, ..., \ell - 1\}$, the *i*-hybrid and (i+1)-hybrid are computationally indistinguishable. This is shown by using a potential distinguisher to violate the pseudorandomness of G''.

Given a distinguisher of the *i*-hybrid and (i + 1)-hybrid, we will show how to distinguish $n \cdot \ell$ samples of the distribution $G''(U_n)$ from $n \cdot \ell$ samples of the distribution U_{4n} . Specifically, given a sequence of samples, we run the search procedure while feeding it with secrets and labels generated on-thefly as follows. When required to provide a label to a newly visited node we always provide the label according to $\Pi'(\alpha, G'(s'))$, where s' is the first part of the parent's secret (and α is the parent's label). The important issue is the generation of secrets:

- Nodes at level $j \leq i$ are assigned uniformly distributed secrets.
- Nodes at level $j \ge i + 2$ are assigned secrets according to G''(s'') where s'' is the second part of their parent's secret.
- Nodes at level i + 1 are assigned secrets (on the fly) that equal the corresponding part of the next unused sample in the input sequence; that is, when a node at level i is first visited, its two children are assigned secrets according to the two parts of the next unused sample.

Note that when the input sequence is taken from U_{4n} , the foregoing process describes the (i + 1)-hybrid, whereas when the input sequence is taken from $G''(U_n)$ we get the *i*-hybrid (although the secrets at level i + 1 do not fit the second part of the secrets at level *i* but rather a re-randomization of the latter).

Combining the two foregoing observations, we conclude that in the real setting the search procedure is successful with probability at least 0.1. Using the correspondence of the real setting to an attack on the function ensemble $\{f_s\}$, Part 2 (and so the entire theorem) follows.

Acknowledgments

The question was originally posed by Silvio Micali (in the early 1990's if I recall correctly), and re-posed by Boaz Barak in Summer 2001. I am grateful to both of them.

References

[CGH98] R. Canetti, O. Goldreich and S. Halevi. The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited. In 30th STOC, pages 209–218, 1998. [GGM84] O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, and S. Micali. How to Construct Random Functions. JACM, Vol. 33, No. 4, pages 792–807, 1986.

Appendix: Proof of Part 3 of Claim 4

Using Part 2, we have

$$\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i - \sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i > 2^{-(t+1)} \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{t} p_i$$
$$= 2^{-(t+1)} \cdot \left(\sum_{i=0}^{t} s_i\right)^2$$
$$= 2^{-(t+1)} \cdot \left(1 - 2^{-(t+1)}\right)^2$$
$$> 2^{-(t+1)} \cdot \left(1 - 2^{-t}\right).$$

On the other hand,

$$p_{t+1} = s_{t+1}^2 + 2s_{t+1} \sum_{i=0}^t s_i$$

= $s_{t+1} \cdot \left(s_{t+1} + 2\sum_{i=0}^t s_i \right)$
= $2^{-(t+2)} \cdot \left(2^{-(t+2)} + 2 \cdot \left(1 - 2^{-(t+1)} \right) \right)$
= $2^{-(t+1)} \cdot \left(1 - 2^{-(t+1)} + 2^{-(t+3)} \right)$
= $2^{-(t+1)} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{3}{8} \cdot 2^{-t} \right)$.

Combining $\Delta_t = \sum_{i=0}^t s_i - \sum_{i=0}^t p_i > 2^{-(t+1)} \cdot (1 - 2^{-t})$ with $p_{t+1} = 2^{-(t+1)} \cdot (1 - \frac{3}{8} \cdot 2^{-t})$, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_t &> \frac{1 - 2^{-t}}{1 - \frac{3}{8} \cdot 2^{-t}} \cdot p_{t+1} \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{\frac{5}{8} \cdot 2^{-t}}{1 - \frac{3}{8} \cdot 2^{-t}}\right) \cdot p_{t+1} \\ &> \left(1 - \frac{\frac{5}{8} \cdot 2^{-t}}{1 - \frac{3}{8}}\right) \cdot p_{t+1} \\ &= \left(1 - 2^{-t}\right) \cdot p_{t+1} \,. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $\Delta_t > \frac{1}{2}p_{t+1}$, provided $t \ge 1$. For t = 0, we note that $\Delta_0 = s_0 - p_0 = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{4}$ whereas $p_1 = \frac{5}{16}$ and so $\Delta_0 = \frac{4}{5} \cdot p_1$. Part 3 follows.

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