Efficient Trace and Revoke Schemes
Moni Naor and Benny Pinkas
Our goal is to design encryption schemes for mass distribution of data
in which it is possible to:
(1) deter users from leaking their personal keys
(2) trace which users leaked keys to construct an illegal decryption device
(3) revoke these keys as to render the device dysfunctional.
We start by designing an efficient revocation scheme, based
on secret sharing. It can remove up to t parties and is secure
against coalitions of size t. The performance of this scheme is more
efficient than that of previously proposed schemes with the same properties.
We then show how to combine the revocation scheme with traitor tracing
and self enforcement schemes. More precisely, how to construct schemes
(1) Each user's personal key contains some sensitive information of that
user (e.g., the user's credit card number), and therefore users would be
reluctant o disclose their keys.
(2) An illegal decryption device discloses the identity of users that contributed
keys to construct the device.
(3) it is possible to revoke the keys of corrupt users. For this point
it is important to be able to do so without publicly disclosing the sensitive
Related On-Line Papers:
Back to On-Line Publications
Cynthia Dwork, Jeff Lotspiech and Moni Naor, Digital Signets: Self-Enforcing
Protection of Digital Information, Abstract
Amos Fiat and Moni Naor, Broadcast Encryption, Abstract,
Dalit Naor, Moni Naor and Jeff Lotspiech, Revocation and Tracing
Schemes for Stateless Receivers, Abstract,
Moni Naor and Benny Pinkas, Threshold Traitor Tracing, Crypto