Polling with Physical Envelopes: A Rigorous Analysis of a Human-Centric Protocol
Tal Moran and Moni Naor
Abstract:
We propose simple, realistic protocols for polling that allow the responder to plausibly
repudiate his response, while at the same time allow accurate statistical analysis of poll results.
The protocols use simple physical objects (envelopes or scratch-off cards) and can be performed without the aid of computers.
One of the main innovations of this work is the
use of techniques from theoretical cryptography to rigorously prove the security
of a realistic, physical protocol. We show that, given a few properties of physical envelopes,
the protocols are unconditionally secure in the universal composability framework.
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Related On-Line Papers:
Other Papers on Cryptography with Humans and Physical Devices
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Visual Cryptography
- Moni Naor and Adi Shamir, Visual Cryptography II,
Cambridge Workshop on Security Protocols, LNCS 1189, Springer, pp. 197-202, 1996.
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- Moni Naor and Benny Pinkas, Visual Authentication,
Crypto 97.
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Tal Moran and Moni Naor
Receipt-Free Universally-Verifiable Voting With Everlasting Privacy, Crypto 2006,
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- Ronen Gradwohl, Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas and Guy Rothblum,
Cryptographic and Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems for Solutions of Sudoku Puzzles,
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- M. Naor, Y. Naor and O. Reingold, Applied Kid
Cryptography or How to convince your children you are not cheating,
August 98.
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